

第六章

思考题:

- 1、翻译中所谓的“形”和“义”是指什么? 如何处理两者之间的关系?
- 2、在进行上述几对转换时需要注意什么问题?
- 3、试谈在进行各类转换过程中, 如何综合、灵活地运用其他翻译方法和技巧。

句子练习:

1. We have winked at these irregularities too long; from now on they will have to stop.
2. The Socialists have decided to go into the opposition.
3. By ten o'clock we had described seven of the enemy's sail.
4. I have no ear for music.
5. Many voices have been raised demanding the setting up of an Arab common market.
6. They worried about new violence in Lebanon.
7. No eye saw him, but a second later every ear heard a gunshot.
8. The matter was finally settled under the table.
9. The deficit on the total current account will remain in triple digits as far as the eye can see.
10. If companies want to tout such random, unaudited, watch-me-pull-a-rabbit-out-of-my-hat figures in their press releases, well, fine.
11. If you're looking for reasons corporate America is in such ill repute, this kind of over-the-top CEO piggishness is a big one.
12. Any industry that is not making profits can now ask the government for help -- in my opinion, the politicians are just throwing good money after bad.
13. The decline of the dollar does, however, have a silver lining. U. S. exports will become cheaper and this will not only help restrain the deterioration in the trade balance over the next two years but will also help boost U. S. economy as a whole.
14. The teenagers don't invite Bob to their parties because he is a wet blanket.
15. With most of the old Chrysler management replaced, a Ford engine now powers Chrysler.
16. The rose of her scarf was picked out with the olive of her dress.
17. The frogs in the fields outside the town were croaking cheerfully.
18. The car rumbled past.

段落练习一

All countries, including poorest, have assets -- human, industrial, natural, financial -- which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete overseas. "Comparative advantage" means that countries prosper by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best. This happens naturally for firms in the domestic market, but that is only half the story. The other half involves the world market. Most firms recognize that the bigger the market the greater their potential -- in terms of achieving efficient scales of operation and having access to large numbers of customers. In other words, liberal trade

policies which allow the unrestricted flow of goods, services and productive inputs multiply the rewards that come with producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price.

But trading success is not a static thing. Competitiveness in particular products can move from company to company when the market changes or new technologies make cheaper and better products possible. History and experience show that whole countries which have enjoyed an advantage, say, in the cost of labour or natural resources, can also become uncompetitive in some goods or services as their economies develop. However, with the stimulus of an open economy, they move on to become competitive elsewhere. This is, in general, a gradual process. For as much as the trading system is allowed to operate without the constraints of protectionism, firms are encouraged to adapt in an orderly and relatively painless way to focus on new products, finding either a new "niche" in their current area or expanding into new product areas.

The alternative of import protection and perpetual government subsidies leads to bloated, inefficient companies supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products. Ultimately, factories close and jobs are lost despite protection and subsidies. If other governments pursue such policies overseas, markets contract and world economic activity is reduced. One of the objectives of the WTO is to prevent such a self-defeating and destructive drift into protectionism.

段落练习二

The objectives of the agricultural negotiations under the Uruguay Round were ambitious and impressive: "to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, reverse protectionism and remove trade distortions in agricultural trade." Many studies have pictured the Uruguay Round agreement as including a significant liberalization of agricultural trade.

Before the agreement, agriculture was exempt from most multilateral trade rules. A mass of complex nontariff was being used to provide the sector with high and variable rates of protection in many countries. Over time, the volume of agricultural trade subject to these barriers increased in virtually every country in the world. Large exporting countries increasingly used export subsidies as a major instrument of protection and a level of protection for agricultural products rose from 41% in 1979-81 to 74% in 1992, which was about 15 times as high as tariffs in manufacturing.

The new rules repressed a fundamental departure from the way agricultural trade was previously treated under the GATT. The agreement mandates the conversion of all nontariff barriers into tariffs (a process known as tariffication), subject to agreed maximum rates. It requires the reduction of tariff equivalents and ordinary tariffs over six years (ten years for developing countries) by an average of 36% (24% for developing countries) with a 15% (10% for developing countries) minimum cut per tariff item.

Without question, tariffication represents a major reform in agricultural trade rules. It moves agricultural trade toward the same treatment as manufactures under the GATT and provides transparency of import protection. Tariffs are generally preferred over other import barriers, since they are more predicable, nondiscriminatory, easier to reduce and less susceptible to corruption,

they also facilitate competition in internal markets and help ensure that importing countries adjust their trade in world market changes.

Although the Round appears to have achieved new transparency in import protection through tariffication, this has come without a great deal of liberalization in most countries. Most developed countries have established new base tariffs that reflect even higher protection than had been provided by the nontariff barriers they replaced. After the 36% reduction is applied in the new base tariffs, tariff rates in the year 2000 will remain very high on many products – in many cases as high as, or even higher than, effective rates prior to the agreement.