第十三章

思考题：

1、 如何理解逻辑与篇章之间的关系？

2、 衔接的作用是什么？试列举篇章翻译中的具体衔接方法。

3、 试论重建译文篇章的连贯性。

段落练习：

1. “It’s like a labyrinth,” says economist Orlando Ferreres, who likens his nation’s plight to the complex, bizarre fantasy worlds created by Argentina’s most famous writer, Jorge Luis Borges.
2. In another country, Guillermo Perez, who will soon graduate from an elite university with an economics degree, could probably look forward to a bright future – a career in finance, perhaps a job with a UN multinational. But it is Argentina, so Perez, 24, isn’t home publishing his resume. Instead, he’s in downtown Buenos Aires on New Year’s Day, clutching a banner emblazoned with the hammer and sickle. Surrounding him are fellow protesters holding wooden sticks, metal pipes, and assorted projectiles. They’re preparing to rumble with supporters of the ruling Peronist party.
3. Wal-Mart in 2003 is, in short, a lot like America in 2003:a sole superpower with a down-home twang. As with Uncle Sam, everyone’s position in the world will largely be defined in relation to Mr. Sam. Is your company a “strategic competitor” like China or a “partner” like Britain? Is it a client state like Israel or a supplier to the opposition like Yemen? Is it France, benefiting from the superpower’s reach while complaining the whole time? Or is it … well, a Target? You can admire the superpower or resent it or – most likely – both. Bust you can’t ignore it.
4. Most big companies face similar challenges right now, but as one of the nation’s ubiquitous players in financial services, Amex is likely to face it sooner than later. Because expenses like travel and entertainment are typically the first to go in a slowdown, Amex may well be the proverbial canary in the coal mine.
5. In order to reach only those areas of the country where Magic Mountain teas were sold, the company would have to use such geographically selective media as spot television, spot radio, newspapers, or regional editions of magazines. The company also wanted a high-frequency medium, thus eliminating magazines from consideration. This preference also made spot radio a more attractive medium than spot television, since the lower costs of radio would allow Magic Mountain to run a greater number of commercials.

篇章练习一

The Chief Freaked-Out Officer

Ed Moneypenny, the 60-year-old chief financial officer of 7-Eleven, shares something important with Enron’s Andy Fastow, Tyco’s Mark Swartz, and WorldCom’s Scott Sullivan – a job title. That, Moneypenny insists, is where the similarities end. Nevertheless, for the past year Moneypenny (could a CFO be any more aptly named?) has had to constantly reassure people – 7-Eleven’s board, its shareholders, the friends and neighbors whom he meets at cocktail parties, and even his three grown sons – that most CFOs are honest operators, and that unlike Fastow, Swartz, and Sullivan, he won’t be led away in handcuffs.

Moneypenny understands why he has had to do this. But he doesn't like it. He worries about the creeping perception that all finance executives are somehow dirty. "I've never had anyone put pressure on me to fudge numbers," he says. "I'm not approachable for that crap."

If Moneypenny sounds a bit defensive, consider how topsy-turvy his world has become. Not so long ago the superstars of CEO-dom were no mere number crunchers. The `90s had given birth to wheeler-dealer finance officers, instrumental in such master-of-the-universe activities as negotiating mergers and acquisitions. Wall Street watched their every move. Think of IBM's Jerome York, who became "the $1.3 billion man," named for the amount Big Blue's stock fell (and Chrysler's gained) the day York defected to aid Kirk Kerkorian in raiding the carmaker. Or Disney's CFO, Stephen Bollenbach, who commanded an unprecedented $20million pay package and helped the entertainment giant capture Capital Cities/ABC. Corporations started looking for financial officers who could do more than cut costs; they wanted someone who could make them money. So CFOs tossed aside their green eyeshades and turned to more creative pursuits. By the late `90s, CFOs were prized for their ability to find new finance and accounting tricks. They became spokesmen, quietly guiding stock analysts to quarterly earnings estimates – and then making sure their companies beat those targets. Still, it's a tough job. The CFO is a convenient scapegoat when a company disappoints Wall Street, and the average one lasts just four years on the job, according to Financial Executives International. But if they succeed, the rewards can be great. Many CFOs have moved up to run their companies.

Now several prominent finance execs have been indicted; some will almost certainly go to jail. The same creative financing techniques that allowed companies to carefully manage their earnings suddenly get a cocked eyebrow and an SEC investigation. New regulations have outlawed some questionable practices, and even legitimate financing tools have been tainted by association with the likes of Enron and WorldCom. Today CFOs are expected to be paragons of transparency and accountability and must personally certify their companies' financial results. But one thing hasn't changed: They still have to make the numbers – or else. Is it any wonder they are freaking out?

篇章练习二

Shareholders Are No Fools – Anymore

You're a fool and a chump. What other conclusion can we draw? You've bought shares in publicly traded companies, haven't you? Then as far as the rules and regulations are concerned, you're too dumb to deserve any say in how those companies ought to be governed. "The law has regarded shareholders as fools since the 1920s," says Charles Elson, director of the University of Delaware's Weinburg Center for Corporate governance and a corporate director himself. "Fools who had to be protected from their own foolish ways."

Not, maybe, for much longer. A swirl of events in recent days and weeks suggests that authorities at many levels are realizing that last year's much-hyped governance reforms aren't doing the job.

Amazingly, despite the honeyed assurances that accompanied the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other measures, they leave shareholders with about as much power to influence governance as a baseball fan has to yank the pitcher. Most significant, the very heart of corporate governance, the election of directors, is still a sham. The shareholder ballots you receive with your proxy materials are just like those Stalin used to distribute. For every position there is exactly one candidate. Please mark your choice.

If something seems insanely wrong here, remember that these rules are based on a view of shareholders as a many-headed beast that can’t be trusted to behave responsibly. Managers, by contrast, are seen wise and beneficent stewards who know what’s really best for shareholders.

And in some cases that may even be true. Bust after the scandals of the past 18 months, nobody’s buying it. The risk of leaving shareholders powerless against managers and directors who are crooked idiots or, worse, crooked geniuses, is no longer tolerable. The Fastows, Sullivans and Kozlowskis blew it, and one way or another the game is now going to change for everybody.